Regulatory procedure and participation in the European Union by Smismans, Stijn
Regulatory	procedure	and	participation	in	the	European	Union.	
Stijn	Smismans∗	
(forthcoming	in	Francesca	Bignami	and	David	Zaring	(eds)	(2016),	The	Elgar	Research	Handbook	on	
Comparative	Law	and	Regulation,	Cheltenham:	Elgar.)	
	
1. Introduction	
Participation	is	at	the	centre	of	democratic	decision-making.		In	both	political	theory	and	public	law	,	
the	predominance	of	representative	democracy	as	a	normative	framework	has	led	to	a	focus	on	the	
legislative	process,	with	the	key	actors	of	public	rulemaking	being	conceived	of		as	elected	
representatives,	on	the	one	hand,		and	‘neutral	public	officials’,	on	the	other.		The	reality	of	public	
policy-making,	however,	is	far	more	complex,	involving		actors	such	as	interest	groups,	civil	society	
organisations,	firms,	NGOs,	and	individual	citizens	long	before	the	idea	of	‘networked	governance’	
became	a	popular	term	in	the	literature.		Yet,	on	the	European	continent	in	particular,	public	lawyers	
have	paid	little	attention	to	such	intermediary	actors.		As	their	role	is	not	set	out	in	national	
constitutions,	they	remain	off	the	radar	of	constitutional	lawyers.		At	the	same	time,	scholarship	on	
European	administrative	law	has	focused	on	individual	rights	vis-à-vis	the	administration	rather	than	
on	group	action	in	the	policy	process	(Harlow	2006:	120).		Rare	exceptions	have	focused	on	the	issue	
of	interest	group	litigation,	rather	than	on	processes	of	interest	representation	or	lobbying	in	
rulemaking.1		The	same	can	be	said	of	the	literature	on	interest	group	participation	in	European	
Union	policy-making:	there	is	an	extensive	political	science	literature	on	EU	lobbying	(Finke	2007;	
Eising	2008)	but	legal	scholars	have	shown	little	interest	in	the	topic,2	except	for	the	issue	of	locus	
standi	in	the	European	Court	of	Justice	(Barnard	1995;	Micklitz	and	Reich	1996;	De	Schutter	2006).3	
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The	virtual	absence	in	legal	scholarship	of	the	topic	of	interest	group	participation	in	policy-making	
can	be	explained	by	the	neo-corporatist	tradition	of	interest	intermediation	on	the	European	
continent.			While	the	involvement	of	(mainly	large	socio-occupational)	interest	groups	in	policy-
making	is	institutionalised,	particularly	via	advisory	and	bargaining	structures,	it	is	not	
proceduralised	by	giving	individuals	and	groups	the	right	to	participate,	rights	which	can	be	enforced	
in	court	via	judicial	review.			Hence,	the	topic	is	confined	to	industrial	relations	studies,	or	to	labour	
law	studies,	in	isolation	from	constitutional	and	administrative	law.			This	tradition	contrasts	with	the	
American	pluralist	tradition	in	which	procedural	rights	(participation,	notice	and	comment,	
transparency)	and	judicial	review	are	thought	to	ensure	a	system	of	interest	group	competition	that	
plays	a	central	role	in	a	system	of	checks	and	balances	and	democratic	and	accountable	public	
rulemaking.		As	a	result,	legal	scholarship	in	the	United	States,	and	administrative	law	scholarship	in	
particular,4		has	paid	more	attention	to	interest	group	participation	in	rulemaking	than	its	European	
counterpart.		
Even	in	Europe,	however,	the	pressures	of	modern	governance	are	forcing	the	legal	discipline	to	
reflect	more	systematically	on	participation	outside	of	the	parliamentary	process.			Dissatisfaction	
with	representative	democracy	has	led	to	calls	for	new	governance	arrangements	in	which	
participation	is	not	limited	to	the	ballot	box.	As	citizens	have	become	more	vocal	in	the	information	
society,	additional	forms	of	participation	and	transparency	have	become	key	requirements	of	
modern	governance.	The	wider	availability	of	information	has,	in	its	turn,	triggered	requests	for	
more	evidence-based	public	decision-making,	which	requires	further	reflection	on	the	appropriate	
participatory	mechanisms	in	policy-making	characterised	by	scientific	uncertainty.		These	issues	are	
particularly	pertinent	in	the	context	of	rulemaking	beyond	the	nation	state,	as	it	has	proven	difficult	
to	simply	copy	traditional	models	of	democracy	and	institutional	design.	
In	this	chapter	I	will	focus	on	participation	in	EU	rulemaking,	which	I	define	to	include	legislation	and	
delegated	legislation.5			I	will	deal	with	legislation	and	delegated	legislation	together,	and	will	thus	
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5	Delegated	legislation	in	the	EU	has	for	a	long	time	taken	the	form	of	the	so-called	‘comitology’	
procedures.	Comitology	is	the	process	through	which	a	legislative	act	(most	commonly	adopted	on	
the	initiative	of	the	European	Commission	and	by	co-decision	by	the	European	Parliament	and	the	
Council)	empowers	the	Commission	to	adopt	further	regulatory	measures	but	at	the	same	time	
conditions	this	delegation	by	requiring	the	Commission	to	interact	with	a	‘comitology	committee’,	
composed	of	representatives	from	the	national	administrations,	thus	allowing	the	Members	States	a	
not	limit	my	attention	to	the	latter	as	one	would	traditionally	do	in	the	US	when	talking	about	
‘rulemaking’.		This	is	for	several	reasons.	Firstly,	the	type	of	activity	performed	via	EU	delegated	
legislation	does	not	easily	fit	into	‘our	inherited	understandings	of	legislation,	adjudication	and	rule-
bound	administration’	(Everson	and	Joerges	2006:	526)	and	it	is	often	difficult	to	draw	a	clear	line	
between	EU	legislation	and	delegated	legislation	(in	particular	regarding	the	subject	matter	covered	
by		the	acts).	This	relates	to	the	nature	of	EU	policy-making,	which	is	mainly	regulatory,	while	
redistributive	policies	remain	the	realm	of	the	Member	States.	Both	EU	legislation	and	delegated	
legislation	therefore	tend	to	be	rather	technical	in	nature.		Secondly,	arguments	and	policy	initiatives	
to	strengthen	participation	in	the	EU	have	mainly	been	made	in	relation	to	legislation	rather	than	
delegated	legislation.		This	again	relates	to	the	particular	nature	of	the	European	polity.			Despite	the	
increased	role	of	the	European	Parliament	(EP)	in	EU	legislation,	European	policy-making	still	
struggles	with	a	legitimacy	deficit	(mainly	due	to	the	lack	of	a	European	public	sphere),	thus	
increasing	the	need	to	consider	all	potential	sources	of	‘input-legitimacy’,	such	as	interest	group	
participation,	even	in	relation	to	legislative	intervention.			
This	chapter	will	thus	deal	with	participation	in	all	forms	of	European	rulemaking	leading	to	binding	
rules	of	a	general	scope.		Notwithstanding	the	EU’s	large,	and	growing,	number	of	institutional	
arrangements	and	policy	instruments,	lawmaking	and	delegated	lawmaking	spearheaded	by	the	
Commission	remain	the	most	important	forms	of	governance	in	the	EU.		As	a	result,	given	the	space	
constraints,	this	chapter	will	focus	on	participation	in	Commission	decision-making	and	will	not	
consider	participation	in	other	forms	of	EU	decision-making	(see	Hofmann	in	this	volume),	such	as	
the	decentralised	networks	of	European	Agencies	(which,	unlike	agencies	in	the	US,	have	a	mainly	
knowledge-gathering	rather	than	a	rule-making	role)6	or	participation	in	soft-law	benchmarking	
procedures,	such	as	the	Open	Method	of	Coordination.7	The	chapter	is	also	limited	to	rulemaking	at	
the	EU	level,	and	will	not	cover	the	EU’s	impact	on	participation	arrangements	at	the	national	level,	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
degree	of	control	over	the	supranational	Commission.	The	system	has	been	revised	by	the	Lisbon	
Treaty,	as	will	be	explained	in	section	4.1.2	below.	
6	For	an	overview	of	the	European	agency	debate,	see	Rittberger	and	Wonka	(2011)	and	Busuioc,	
Groenleer	and	Trondal	(2012).	
7	 EU	official	 documents	have	often	 stressed	 the	benefits	 of	 broad	 civil	 society	participation	 in	 the	
Open	Method	of	Coordination	(OMC),	and	some	scholars	have	heralded	the	OMC	as	an	example	of	
participatory	experimentalist	governance.	 	See	Gerstenberg	and	Sabel	 (2002)	and	Sabel	and	Zeitlin	
(2008).	Others	have	questioned	the	bottom-up	participatory	credentials	of	the	OMC	and	new	modes	
of	governance	more	generally.		See	Smismans	(2008).	
such	as	via	the	Aarhus	Convention.8	Finally,	I	will	deal	with	the	role	of	interest	groups	as	policy	
advocates	in	rulemaking,	not	with	their	role	as	service	providers	in	policy	implementation	nor	with	
the	self-regulatory	schemes	developed	and	administered	by	different	socio-economic	groups.	
The	chapter	is	structured	as	follows.		In	section	2,	I	analyse	how	the	European	neo-corporatist	
tradition	influenced	the	EEC/EU’s	initial	approach	to	interest	group	participation	in	policy-making.		
These	formal	institutional	arrangements,	however,	were	quickly	paralleled	by	a	more	informal	
pluralist	practice	as	a	consequence	of	the	multiple	access	points	that	characterise	EU	policy-making	
as	well	as	the	dispersed	character	of	the	interest	group	field	at	the	EU	level.		This	pluralist	practice	is	
not	proceduralised	and	does	not	provide	for	participatory	rights	and	judicial	review	as	is	
characteristic	of	pluralist	institutional	design	in	the	U.S..		In	section	3,	I	examine	how	the	EU,	since	
the	mid-1990s,	has	started	to	address	the	issue	of	interest	group	participation	more	explicitly,	as	a	
result	of	both	a	(perceived)	need	to	increase	the	legitimacy	of	its	policy-making	and	the	need	to	
provide	an	institutional	response	to	the	increasing	pluralisation	of	interest	groups.		The	EU’s	answer	
has	been	to	resort	to	the	concept	of	civil	society,	and	to	provide	for	‘pluralisation	without	
proceduralisation’,	which	has	focused	much	more	on	the	legislative	process	rather	than	on	
delegated	legislation.		In	the	last	section,	I	focus	on	three	major	debates	that	have	characterised	the	
EU	over	the	last	decade	and	which	have	(theoretically)	the	potential	to	move	EU	interest	
representation	more	in	the	direction	of	the	American	pluralist	model:		the	changes	introduced	by	
the	Lisbon	Treaty	(and	in	particular	its	new	system	of	delegated	legislation);	the	better	regulation	
debate;	and	the	European	Transparency	Initiative.	Nevertheless,	I	conclude	that	although	the	
‘traditional’	neo-corporatist	design	is	ever	more	under	threat,	the	EU’s	approach	remains	one	of	
‘pluralisation	without	proceduralisation’	(one	which	is	gradually	being	extended	to	delegated	
legislation)	and	judicial	review	initiated	by	interest	groups	continues	to	be	viewed	as	a	fairly	
marginal	device	for	ensuring	balanced	representation	in	policy-making.		
			
2. The	EU	between	European	neo-corporatist	inspiration	and	informal	pluralist	practice	
2.1.	The	European	neo-corporatist	tradition	
																																								 																				
8	The	UN	Aahrus	Convention	has	been	translated	by	the	EU	in	two	Directives	and	one	Regulation	
dealing	respectively	with	national	and	European	level	participation	and	transparency	in	
environmental	matters,	see	http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/legislation.htm	.	
The	system	of	interest	group	participation	in	policy-making	in	Western	European	countries	has	a	
long	neo-corporatist	tradition.		Neo-corporatism	has	been	described	by	political	scientists	(Schmitter	
and	Lehmbruch	1979;	Lehmbruch	and	Schmitter1982;	Cawson	1986;	Williamson	1989)	as	a	system	of	
interest	intermediation	in	which	a	limited	number	of	rather	encompassing	socio-occupational	
organisations	(particularly	trade	unions	and	employer	organisations)	obtain	a	privileged	role	in	
policy-making.		Tripartite	negotiation	(between	government,	trade	unions	and	employer	
organisations)	characterises	central	government	policies,	while	trade	unions	and	employer	
organisations	often	deal	with	more	specific	socio-occupational	issues	in	an	autonomous,	self-
regulatory	way	via	bipartite	bargaining.		The	model	depends	on	the	existence	of	strong	trade	unions	
and	employer	organisations,	which	are	representative	of	their	sectors	and	which	are	in	a	position	to	
ensure	the	acceptance	of	negotiated	central	bargains	by	their	members.	It	equally	depends	on	a	
relative	balance	of	power	between	trade	unions	and	employer	organisations.		To	ensure	this	type	of	
balanced	system	of	strong	organisations,		the	state	takes	on		an	active	role,	both	supporting	these	
organisations	and	creating	an	institutional	framework	to	involve	them	in	decision-making.			With	the	
exception	of	the	right	to	strike,	however,		the	system	is	based	on	a	balance	of	countervailing	
bargaining	powers	rather	than	on	a	set	of	detailed	participation	rights	subject	to	judicial	review.		
Neo-corporatism	developed	post-World	War	II	and	goes	hand	in	hand	with	the	development	of	the	
welfare	state	and	central	policy	intervention	focused	on	socio-economic	as	well	as	industrial	policy.	
The	European	neo-corporatist	tradition	has	often	been	defined	in	contrast	to	the	American	pluralist	
tradition	(Wagner	in	this	volume).		As	early	as	the	1950s,	authors	such	as	Truman	(1951)	and	Dahl	
(1956	and	1961)	described	the	American	polity	as	a	process	in	which	interest	groups	struggle	for	
influence.		Characteristic	of	their	pluralist	model	is	the	division	of	power	between	different	power	
centres,	creating	multiple	points	of	access	for	a	large	number	of	interest	groups.	The	state	tends	to	
be	placed	in	a	passive	role,	registering	the	demands	of	group	interests.9		Though	the	early	American	
pluralists	such	as	Truman	and	Dahl	called	themselves	‘empirical	democratic	theorists’	(Held	1996:	
199),10	they	tended	to	legitimate	or	even	glorify	(Hyman	1978:	18;	Nino	1996:	82)	the	system	of	
																																								 																				
9	‘Government	is	[…]	the	target	for	group	activity,	and	the	arbiter	of	group	demands,	but	its	role	is	
responsive.	Governments	do	not	create	or	fashion	interests…’,	Cawson	(1986:	47).	
10	 Their	 stated	 aim	was	 to	 highlight	 how	 classic	 democratic	 ideals	 and	 theoretical	 conceptions	 of	
representative	 government	 failed	 to	 capture	 the	 way	 in	 which	 politics	 really	 worked	 (Held	 1996:	
199).		
group	competition	as	the	best	way	to	come	to	a	democratic	equilibrium	in	society.11	Their	model	has	
also	been	called	‘interest	group	liberalism’	since	the	democratic	equilibrium	is	supposed	to	be	the	
outcome	of	an	unregulated	process.	State	intervention	is	minimal	and	individuals	are	conceived	as	
utilitarian	satisfaction-maximisers	(Cohen	and	Rogers	1995:	13).	Contrary	to	utilitarian	theorists,	
however,	pluralists	contend	that	the	best	way	to	maximise	satisfaction	is	for	individuals	to	organise	
into	groups	to	pressure	government	on	issues	of	concern	to	them.		If	people	fail	to	organise	and	to	
participate	in	politics	they	can	be	assumed	to	be	satisfied	with	the	policy	output.		It	is	also	argued	
that	because	of	the	multiple	access	points	to	government	and	the	tendency	for	individuals	to	have		
overlapping	memberships	in	different	organisations,	no	group	can	become	dominant	over	others.	
Consequently,	the	‘general	interest’	is	but	the	automatic	outcome	of	interest	group	competition.12		
The	 normative	 assumptions	 of	 this	 model	 of	 ‘interest	 group	 liberalism’	 have	 been	 seriously	
challenged,	most	notably	in	the	work	of	Mancur	Olson	(1965),13	which	made	clear	that	unregulated	
group	 competition	 could	not	 lead	 to	an	automatic	democratic	 equilibrium,	 given	 the	 inequality	of	
resources	 of	 interest	 groups.	 The	 response,	 in	 public	 law,	 was	 to	 proceduralise	 processes	 of	
representation	 and	 bargaining,	 to	 ensure	 that	 all	 interests	 would	 have	 an	 equal	 chance	 of	 being	
heard	 and	 influencing	 outcomes.14	 The	 history	 of	 American	 constitutional	 and	 administrative	 law,	
and	especially	of	judge-made	public	law,	is	characterised	by	this	attempt	to	ensure	equal	access	to	
policy-making	 by	 building	 on	 the	 principles	 of	 transparency	 and	 ‘due	 process’	 (Shapiro	 1988:	 36;	
Stewart	1975;	Sunstein	1985;	Craig	1990:	56).	Both	legislatures	and	bureaucrats	are	required	to	take	
into	account	the	variety	of	concerned	 interests	 in	policy-making	 ,	and	are	subject	to	review	by	the	
judiciary	 for	 compliance	 with	 these	 requirements,	 though	 with	 considerably	 more	 rigour	 for	
																																								 																				
11	 It	 should,	 however,	 also	 be	 noted	 that	 in	 certain	 cases	 later	 ‘neo-corporatist	 authors’	 straw	
manned		the	pluralist	model,	making	it	easier	to	criticize	(Nedelmann	and	Meier1979:	94).		
12	 The	 only	 value	 transcending	 the	 private	 interests	 of	 groups	 is	 an	 assumed	 ‘community	 of	
purpose’―,	 a	 consensus	 about	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 game,	 i.e.	 everybody	 accepts	 that	 interest-group	
competition	generates	the	‘general	interest’	(Lowi	1969:	294).	
13	 Olson	 (1965)	 pointed	 to	 problems	 such	 as	 ‘free-riding’:	 a	 common	 interest	 shared	 by	 a	 large	
aggregate	 of	 individuals	 will	 have	 difficulties	 influencing	 policy-making	 because	 people	 do	 not	
organise	when	 they	 think	 they	 profit	 from	 the	 action	 of	 others.	 Conversely,	 interests	 shared	 by	 a	
small	group	will	strongly	influence	government	because	of	the	greater	incentives	to	organise.	
14	Cohen	and	Rogers	(1995:	28)	therefore	talk	about	‘egalitarian	pluralism’.	
administrative	 than	 legislative	 decision-making	 (see	 Sunstein	 1985:	 65).15	 With	 respect	 to	
administrative	rule-making,	the	Administrative	Procedure	Act	(APA)	requires	a	notice	and	comment	
procedure	which	obliges	an	agency	to	give	notice	that	it	is	contemplating	a	rule,	receive	comments	
from	 interested	outsiders,	print	 its	 final	 rule	 in	 the	Federal	Register	and	accompany	 the	published	
rule	with	a	 concise	and	general	 statement	of	 its	basis	 and	purpose	 (Wagner	 this	 volume).	 For	 the	
adjudicative	 decisions	 of	 agencies,	 the	 APA	 provides	 for	 trial-like	 procedures.16	 The	way	 in	 which	
administrative	 law	 has	 intervened	 to	 ensure	 due	 process	 for	 individuals	 and	 groups	 is	 at	 once	 a	
departure	 and	 a	 continuation	of	 the	 initial	 pluralist	 idea	of	 interest	 group	 liberalism.	 	On	 the	one	
hand,	 it	requires	legal	 intervention	to	ensure	‘fair’	 interest	group	competition.	 	On	the	other	hand,	
the	focus	is	on	creating	formal	equality	in	the	legal	opportunity	to	participate,	leading	potentially	to	
an	imbalance	between	those	with	enough	resources	to	use	the	legal	channels	(repeatedly)	and	those	
without	such	resources	 (Wagner	 this	volume).	 	 	 	With	 its	emphasis	on	 formal	equality	 ,	 the	model	
stays	 loyal	 to	 its	 original	 underpinnings	 (and	 contrasts	 sharply	 with	 the	 neo-corporatist	 starting	
point),	 namely	 that	 the	 state	 should	 not	 actively	 intervene	 to	 facilitate	 the	 organization	 of	 civil	
society	or	to	create	representative	settings,	as	interest	group	competition	will	ensure	the	emergence	
of	the	public	interest	in	a	system	of	checks	and	balances.17		As	Bignami	(2011)	argues,	this	difference	
between	 the	 American	 pluralist	 model	 and	 the	 European	 neo-corporatist	 model	 links	 to	 broader	
political	 cultural	 differences	 in	 how	 the	 relation	 between	 the	 state	 and	 society	 is	 conceptualised,	
with	the	European	tradition	more	open	towards	State	 intervention	to	ensure	the	public	good,	and	
the	American	one	more	inclined	to	rely	on	competitive	processes.18	
																																								 																				
15	The	underlying	idea	is	that	in	reviewing	legislative	action,	especially	when	the	relevant	questions	
concern	the	motivations	for	such	action,	courts	ought	to	give	legislators	every	benefit	of	the	doubt.				
16	On	the	pro-active	role	of	the	judiciary	in	formulating	ever	more	demanding	requirements	for	equal	
access	to	processes	of	administrative	adjudication	and	rule-making,	and	even	legislation,	see	Shapiro	
(1988),	 Sunstein	 (1985)	 	 and	 Stewart	 (1975).	 This	 tendency	 reached	 its	 apogee	 in	 the	 early	 1980s	
when	 disillusionment	with	 the	 ‘almost	 frantic	 pursuit	 of	more	 and	more	 perfect	 pluralism’	 set	 in	
(Shapiro	1988:	49).			
17	The	U.S.	has	experimented	with	more	consensual	forms	of	interest	consultation,	for	instance,	the	
committees	established	pursuant	to	the	Federal	Advisory	Committee	Act,	and	negotiated	regulation,	
but	they	have	remained	at	the	margins	of	a	system	that	is	mainly	based	on	interest	competition	via	
the	notice	and	comment	process	(see	Wagner	this	volume).	
18	This	is	also	related	to	differences	in	legal	culture,	with	the	American	legal	system	relying	more	on	
‘adversial	legalism’	and	the	European	one	placing	more	trust	in	bureaucratic	decision-making	(Kagan	
2007).		
The	European	neo-corporatist	alternative	to	pluralism	has	been	in	decline	since	the	1980s	for	
multiple	reasons.		Due	to	the	pluralisation	of	society	and	the	labour	market,	people	identify	with	a	
wider	variety	of	functional	groups	and	not	necessarily	with	big	encompassing	organisations	of	
management	and	labour.	At	the	same	time,	government	intervention	today	extends	to	a	wide	array	
of	new	regulatory	areas	(environment,	consumer,	public	health,	research	&	innovation,	and	so	on),	
in	which	management	and	labour	are	not	necessarily	the	best	informed	interest	groups	or	those		
with	the	highest	stakes.		By	the	same	token,		those	areas	of	socio-economic	governance	such		as	
industrial	policy	and	labour	market	protection,	and,	more	recently,	welfare	policy,	which	directly	
implicate	neo-corporatism	have	been	pushed	back	by	neo-liberalism	and	globalization,	trends	which	
have	also		undermined	a	key	component	of	the	model,	namely	the	organisational	capacity	of	labour.		
That	being	said,	more	decentralised,	multi-level,	and	slimmed-down	versions	of	neo-corporatism	
continue	to	operate	in	several	European	countries,19	often	allowing	for	more	egalitarian	policy-
outcomes	less	prone	to	changes	in	the	economic	growth	cycle.20		While	trade	unions	have	nowhere	
near	the	organisational	capacity	they	had	in	the	past,	the	neo-corporatist	legacy	continues	to	shape	
in	important	ways	state-society	relations	and	institutional	approaches	to	interest	intermediation.	
	
2.2.	 The	 impact	 of	 the	 neo-corporatist	 tradition	 on	 the	 EU:	 institutionalisation	 without	
proceduralisation	
Moving	from	the	national	 level	to	the	EU,	the	European	neo-corporatist	 legacy	has	also	 influenced	
the	way	in	which	interest	group	participation	is	organised	within	EU	policy-making.	At	the	creation	of	
the	 European	 Coal	 and	 Steel	 Community	 in	 1951	 it	 was	 considered	 indispensable	 to	 involve	 the	
social	partners	in	the	new	supranational	organisation,	given	their	central	role	at	the	national	level	in	
																																								 																				
19	Updates	on	the	neo-corporatist	model	can	be	found		both	in	the	literature	on	comparative	
industrial	relations	(e.g.	Crouch	(1993)	and	European	Foundation	for	Living	and	Working	Conditions	
(2013))	and	in	the	varieties	of	capitalism	literature,	in	which	the	relationship	between	interest	
groups	and	the	state	constitutes	one	of	several	dimensions	of	political	economy		that	together	result	
in		different	models	of	capitalism	or	models	of	welfare	states,	e.g.	Esping-Andersen	(1990)	and	
Ebbinghaus	and	Manow	(2001).	
20	While	the	economic	crisis	that	started	in	2008	has	accelerated	the	trend	towards	decentralisation	
of	industrial	relations,	those	countries	with	the	most	developed	industrial	relations	systems	have	
been	able	to	cushion	their	economies	better	from	the	negative	impacts	of	the	crisis	(Hyman	2010;	
Glassner,	Keune	and	Marginson	2011).	
this	area.	Consequently,	the	High	Authority,	the	predecessor	of	the	European	Commission,	included	
persons	 close	 to	 or	 emanating	 from	 the	 trade	 union	movement	 (European	 Trade	 Union	 Institute	
1990:	44).	In	addition,	to	assist	the	High	Authority,	a	separate	Consultative	Committee	was	created,	
composed	of	representatives	of	producers,	workers,	consumers	and	traders.21	
A	similar	approach	was	subsequently	followed	for	the	European	Economic	Community	at	its	creation	
in	1957.	 	All	 founding	Member	States,	except	Germany,22	had	economic	and	social	 councils	at	 the	
national	 level	 and	 favoured	 the	 creation	 of	 such	 a	 council	 at	 the	 European	 level.	 	 The	 European	
Economic	 and	 Social	 Committee	 (EESC),	 composed	 of	 representatives	 from	 national	 socio-
occupational	 organisations	 (trade	 unions,	 employer	 organisations	 and	 professional	 associations),	
was	set	up	with	an	advisory	function	similar	to	that	of	the	European	Parliamentary	Assembly.	 	The	
creation	 of	 the	 EESC	 should	 be	 placed	 within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 sector-by-sector	 approach	 to	
European	 integration	 (Lodge	 and	 Herman	 1980:	 267).	 The	 ‘Monnet	method’	 (Featherstone	 1994:	
155;	Wallace	1996:	42)	was	based	on	 the	 involvement	of	key	economic	elites,	 including	organised	
labour,	in	each	of	the	particular	sectors		targeted	for	integration	on	the	theory	that	they	would	build	
transnational	coalitions	 in	support	of	European	policies	(Wallace	1993:	300).	 	The	first	Commission	
(and	 the	 High	 Authority	 in	 the	 ECSC)	 did	 not	 bring	 proposals	 to	 the	 Council	 without	 having	 first	
obtained	the	agreement	of	interest	groups	at	the	European	level	(McLaughlin	1985:	164),	and	it	was	
in	particular	hrough	the	EESC	that	these	interest	groups	were	represented.23	It	has	even	been	argued	
that	the	agreement	reached	among	the	socio-economic	interests	in	the	EESC	carried	greater	weight	
than	 the	 opinion	 of	 the	 Assembly,	 since,	 during	 the	 initial	 period,	 it	 was	 composed	 of	 leading	
personalities	from	well-established	socio-economic	organisations,	whereas	the	Assembly	was	still	a	
non-directly	elected	body	(Corbey	1996:	346).	
																																								 																				
21	On	the	creation	and	the	first	years	of	this	Committee,	see	Mechi	(2000).	
22	Germany’s	reluctance	was	due	to	its	experience	with	corporatist	institutions	under	Fascism.			For	
purposes	of	 the	discussion	 in	this	chapter,	however,	 it	 is	 important	to	keep	 in	mind	the	difference	
between	‘authoritarian	corporatism’	(through	which	authoritarian	regimes	were	linked	to	economic	
elites,	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 fake	 trade	 unions	 were	 used	 to	 control	 labor)	 and	 ‘societal’	 and	
‘liberal’	corporatism	,	which		developed	later	(hence	‘neo-corporatism’)	and		 in	which	trade	unions	
and	employer	organisations	operated	as	 	 free	organisations	and	were	guaranteed	autonomy	 from	
the	state	(Schmitter	1979).	
23	On	the	attitude	of	the	first	Commission	president,	Walter	Hallstein,	see	Lodge	and	Herman	(1980:	
269).	
However,	as	the	EEC,	and	then	EU,	engaged	in	increasingly	more	policy	areas,	the	EESC	lost	much	of	
its	appeal	(Smismans	2000).		First	of	all,	being	composed	of	representatives	from	national	socio-
occupational	organisations,	it	could	not	provide	a	forum	for	traditional	tripartite	corporatist	
bargaining	between	key	representatives	of	broad,	encompassing	organisations	capable	of	
committing	their	organisations.		Moreover,	as	the	EU	became	involved	in	more	regulatory	fields,	the	
socio-economic	focus	of	the	EESC	prevented	it	from	representing	the	diversity	of	interests	and	
expertise	implicated		by	the	expanding	agenda.		Hence	interest	groups	increasingly	lobbied	directly		
the	European	Commission,	Council	and	European	Parliament	(in	the	case	of	the	latter,	as	its	powers	
began	to	increase)	and	established	offices	in	Brussels	which	could	serve	as	a	base	for	these	lobbying	
efforts.		Many	political	scientists	have	therefore	described	the	system	of	interest	intermediation	in	
the	EU	as	pluralist.		This	pluralist	system	is	defined	by	two	principal	characteristics:		(1)	it	involves	a	
diverse	and	large	set	of		interest	groups	(European	and	national	associations,	as	well	as	individual	
firms	and	consultancies)	rather	than	a	limited	number	of	encompassing	and	representative	
associations;	(2)		the	policy-making	process	contains	many	points	of	access,	both	through	the	
multiple	institutional	players	at	the	European	level	and	through	the	national	politics	of	the	Member	
States	(Streeck	and	Schmitter	1991;	Schmidt	1997).		
Notwithstanding	these	developments,	it	is	important	to	appreciate	the	continuing	influence	of	the	
neo-corporatist	underpinnings	of	the	EU’s	system	of	interest	intermediation.		First,	in	the	field	of	
European	social	policy,	since	the	mid	1980s	the	EU	has	developed	the	European	social	dialogue	
procedure,	which	copies	the	neo-corporatist	model	of	some	of	its	Member	States.		The	European	
Commission	is	obliged	to	consult	the	Europe-wide	federations	of	national	trade	unions	and	employer	
organisations	on	all	of	its	legislative	proposals	in	the	area;		these	federations	can	decide	to	take	on	
the	issue	themselves	through		bipartite	negotiation	(collective	agreements),	sidestepping	the	
Commission	and	the	other	EU	institutions,	and	their	collective	agreements	can	be	given	legal,	
binding	force.		Although	the	scope	of	the	social	dialogue	is	limited	to	the	field	of	social	policy,	and	its	
results	have	been	modest,24	it	follows	a	traditional,	neo-corporatist	design.		
Second,	and	more	important	for	this	analysis,	while	from	the	perspective	of	political	science	the	
pluralist	label	may	better	capture	informal	lobbying	practices	in	the	EU,	the	characterization	is	less	
apt	from	a	legal	perspective	focused	on	institutional	design	and	its	impact	on	interest	group	
participation.		As	discussed	earlier,	in	the	U.S,	the	procedural	guarantees	of	administrative	law	have	
been	shaped	by	the	pluralist	idea	that	free	interest	group	competition	plays	a	central	role	in	the	
																																								 																				
24	For	an	overview	of	the	European	social	dialogue,	and	the	EU’s	role	in	industrial	relations	more	
broadly,	see	Smismans	(2012).	
definition	of	the	public	good	and	in	the	control	of	government	power	in	a	system	of	checks	and	
balances.			Transparency,	access	to	documents,	and	notice-and-comment	procedure	allow	all	
stakeholders	(or	at	least	those	with	enough	resources	to	organise	effectively)	to	participate	in	rule-
making,	with	access	to	judicial	review	as	an	oversight	mechanism.		This	system	of	pluralist	
proceduralisation	is	foreign	to	the	EU.		Instead,	the	institutionalisation	of	interest	group	participation	
in	the	EU	displays	more	neo-corporatist	features.			
A	key	element	of	this	neo-corporatist	design	is	the	institution	of	advisory	committees.		Advisory	
committees	have	existed	since	the	creation	of	the	EEC	and	have	multiplied	over	time.		They	are	
generally	specific	to	a	policy	field	or	policy	problem	and	can	provide	the	EU	institutions,	and	the	
European	Commission	in	particular,	with	far	more	in-depth	expertise	and	representative	positions	
than	the	‘generalist’	EESC.		These	advisory	committees	or	expert	groups25	can	be	composed	of	
‘independent’	scientific	experts,	of	representatives	from	national	administrations,	of	interest	groups,	
or	a	combination	of	the	three.26		The	European	Register	of	Expert	Groups	today	lists	832	expert	
groups,27	503	of	which	include	representatives	of	interest	groups,	and	142	of	which	are	exclusively	
composed	of	such	groups.		Advisory	committees	can	be	set	up	formally,	i.e.	by	a	Commission	
decision,	but	more	often	they	are	created	informally	by	a	Commission	unit.		Some	committees	have	
a	role	in	the	drafting	of	legislation	and/or	delegated	legislation,	while	other	are	involved	in	policy	
implementation.		Some	are	permanent,	while	others	are	‘ad	hoc’	created	for	a	single	policy	initiative.		
Except	for	some	cases	where	the	creation	of	such	a	committee	is	required	by	legislation,	the	
establishment	as	well	as	the	composition	of	such	committees	is	at	the	discretion	of	the	Commission.	
To	constitute	a	committee,	the	Commission	Directorate	General	(DG)	in	the	relevant	policy	area	may	
use	a	‘public’	call	for	experts	on	its	website	but	may	also	simply	rely	on	its	existing	informal	networks	
or	ask	Member	States	to	propose	experts.		Equally,	it	is	entirely	within	the	discretion	of	the	
Commission	DG	whether	it	will	take	into	account	the	opinion	of	such	a	committee.			
For	a	long	time,	these	committees	have	functioned	completely	outside	of	public	view.			There	was	no	
transparency	on	the	exact	number	of	committees	or	their	composition.		Today,	the	Commission’s	
online	Register	of	Expert	Groups	aims	at	providing	an	overview	of	all	advisory	committees,	as	well	as	
																																								 																				
25	The	Commission	traditionally	called	them	‘advisory	committees’,	but	has	more	recently	shifted	to	
the	term		‘expert	groups’.		In	this	discussion,	I	use	the	two	terms	interchangeably.			
26	For	an	overview	of	the	types	of	expert	committees	and	their	functioning,	see	Larsson	and	Murk	
(2007:	94)..	
27	Please	see,	http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm,	last	accessed	on	16/08/14.	
their	composition.28	However,	the	Commission	does	not	publish	general	calls	to	fill	positions	on	
advisory	committees	and	does	not	invite	comment	on	the	proposals.	Neither	are	opinions	of	expert	
groups	systematically	published.			This	system	of	interest	intermediation,	therefore,	operates	very	
differently	from	the	proceduralised	American	system	and	appears	to	be	inspired	more	by	the	
European	neo-corporatist	tradition.		While	EU	administration	has	ample	discretionary	powers,	it	is,	
at	least	in	theory,	to	be	guided	by	the	objective	of	involving	the	key	(preferably	representative)	
actors	in	the	field.		These	actors	are	brought	together	in	a	committee	and	are	expected	to	discuss	or	
negotiate	in	order	to	produce	a	common	position.		While	the	criteria	for	selecting	committee	
members	are	rarely	made	explicit,		advisory	committees	are	generally	constituted	with	the	ambition	
of	generating	a	representative	‘European	view’,	and	to	that	end	often	include	representatives	from	
all	Member	States	(either	from	national	administrations	or	interest	groups)	or	from	Europe-wide	
associations	(which	tend	to	be	confederations	of	national	interest	groups).		In	many	cases,	the	
Commission	has	also	privileged	such	European	organisations	when	informally	sounding	out	the	
public	and	gathering	information	on	policy	initiatives.			Moreover,	it	has	created	several	funding	
programmes	and	budget	lines	to	support	the	creation	and	development	of	Europe-wide	associations	
(Mahoney	and	Beckstrand	2011),	in	particular	those	representing	non-profit,	‘weaker’	(e.g.	trade	
unions)	or	‘public	interest’	(e.g.	environmental,	consumer,	social	inclusion…)	sectors.	This	active	
support	for	civil	society	organisations	even	extends	to	financial	assistance	for	such	organisations	at	
the	national	level	in	countries	where	intermediate	organisations	are	poorly	established,	particularly	
in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	after	communism,	on	the	theory	that	weak	national	organisations	
undermine	the	representativeness	of	confederal	associations	at	the	European	level	(Pérez-Solórzano	
Borragán	and	Smismans	2012).	
Taken	together,	the	EU’s	system	of	interest	intermediation	can	be	conceptualized	as	‘neo-
corporatist	in	inspiration	combined	with	informal	pluralist	practice’.		The	use	of	advisory	committees	
that	aim	at	some	level	of	representativeness	and	deliberate	or	negotiate	common	positions,	as	well	
as	active	financial	support	for	the	development	of	civil	society	organisations	bear	witness	to	the	neo-
corporatist	legacy.	At	the	same	time,	EU	institutions	have	not	closed	their	doors	to	informal	
lobbying,	which	is	‘pluralist’	both	in	terms	of	the	diversity	of	the	interest	groups	involved	and	the	
number	of	access	points.		Although	this	system	is	institutionalised,	it	does	not	follow	the	
proceduralised,	pluralist	template	of	U.S.	law:		it	is	not	transparent,	it	lacks	participation	rights,	and	
it	limits	judicial	review	of	the	process	of	rule-making.		With	respect	to	legislative	action,	whether	and	
																																								 																				
28	There	are	no	data	available	on	whether	the	Register	is	in	reality	exhaustive,	given	the	informality	of	some	of	
the	advisory	committees.		However,	publication	of	the	existence	of	a	committee	has	become	the	norm	the	
Commission	intends	to	follow.	Information	on	the	composition	relates	to	the	organizations	represented	rather	
than	to	the	individuals	composing	the	committee.	
how	to	use	advisory	committees	lies	entirely	within	the	discretion	of	the	Commission	and	other	
institutional	actors.		With	respect	to	delegated	legislation,	there	is	the	possibility	of	obtaining	judicial	
review	of	the	process	in	those	cases	in	which	the	legislation	delegating	regulatory	power	requires	
the	Commission	to	consult	an	advisory	committee	(or	interact	with	a	so-called	‘comitology	
committee’	composed	of	representatives	from	national	administrations).		If	the	Commission	fails	to	
engage	in	consultation,	it	can	be	taken	to	court,	but	this	type	of	explicit	consultation	requirement	is	
the	exception	rather	than	the	rule	and,	in	any	event,	neither	the	advisory	committee	nor	any	
interest	group	(represented	or	not	on	the	committee)	would	have	the	right	to	contest	a	final	legal	
act	because	of	a	failure	to	take	into	account	their	opinion.		
It	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	analysis	to	draw	any	comparative	conclusions	on	whether	this	
European	system	of	‘neo-corporatist	inspiration	with	informal	pluralist	practice’	would	score	better	
or	worse	in	terms	of	‘fairness’	than	the	American	proceduralised	pluralist	model.		In	some	of	the	
more	recent	literature,	this	system	has	been	said	to	generate	policy-learning	(Knoepfel	and	Kissling-
Näf	1998),	or	even	constitute	a	form	of	deliberative	democracy	(Habermas	1996;	Elster	1998;	
Bohman	and	Rehg	1997;	Dryzek	2000)	at	least	to	the	extent	that	‘interests’	are	not	set	in	stone	and	
the	positions	of	committee	members	are	constituted	through	deliberation.		The	link,	however,	
between	the	reality	of	committee	governance	and	theories	of	deliberative	democracy	is	problematic	
since	the	current	process	is	opaque	and	does	not	appear	to	be	linked	to	deliberation	in	the	wider	
public	sphere.			While	this	lack	of	transparency	may	not	have	been	objectionable	in	traditional	neo-
corporatism,	since	officials	from	broadly	representative	social	partner	organisations	ultimately	had	
to	defend	the	outcomes	of	committee	bargaining	to	their	memberships,	the	difficulty	of	establishing	
such	organisations	today,	especially	at	the	European	level,	makes	it	more	suspect.			Thus,	even	
though	advisory	committees	have	the	potential	to	provide	a	forum	for	deliberation	among	
representative	organizations	and	even	though	the	Commission	has	made	an	effort	to	bolster	the	
organizational	capacity	of	certain	diffuse	interests,	there	is	also	evidence	of	cases	in	which	advisory	
committees	do	not	offer	a	‘fair’	representation	of	interests.			
One	indication	of	this	representational	imbalance	can	be	found	in	the	results	of	an	inquiry	led	by	
ALTER-EU	(Alliance	for	Lobbying	Transparency	and	Ethics	Regulation	in	the	EU),29	an	association	of	
about	200	civil	society	organisations,	trade	unions,	academics	and	public	affairs	firms.		ALTER-EU	
argues	that	roughly	100	of	the	832	or	so	expert	groups	in	existence	today	are	dominated	by	large	
corporations,	especially	in	key	policy	areas	such	as	the	Internal	Market,	Agriculture,	and	Enterprise	
																																								 																				
29	Please	see,	www.alter-eu.org,	last	accessed	on	16/01/14:		
and	Industry.30		One	of	the	culprits	of	this	outcome	is	the	absence	of	clear	rules	on	‘conflict	of	
interests’,	which	enables	individuals	working	in	or	for	private	companies	to	regularly	register	as	
individual	independent	experts	rather	than	as	representatives	of	an	interest	group	when	they	serve	
on	expert	committees.		In	sum,	it	is	unlikely	that	the	system	of	(neo-corporatist)	EU	expert	
committees	can	fully	compensate	for	the	imbalances	of	free	interest	competition	in	(pluralist)	EU	
lobbying.		Whether	the	American	proceduralised	system,	with	formal,	equal	participation	rights	and	
extensive	judicial	review,	but	significant	informal	inequalities,	would	score	any	better	in	terms	of	
fairness	is	another	question	(Wagner	in	this	volume).				
3. Reconciling	European	tradition	with	further	pluralisation?	‘Pluralisation	without	
proceduralisation’		
	
3.1. 	Transparency:	‘pluralisation	without	proceduralisation’	(the	pluralist	way)	
Despite	the	proliferation	of	both	informal	lobbying	and	advisory	committees,	the	EU	did	not	adopt	a	
horizontal	approach	to	interest	group	regulation	until	the	early	1990s.	The	system	remained	opaque	
and	ad	hoc,	with	no	coordinated	practices	in	the	different	Directorates	General	of	the	Commission.		
With	the	Maastricht	Treaty,	however,	which	extended	the	EU’s	competences	considerably	and	was	
expected	to	generate	a	commensurate	proliferation	of	EU	interest	group	activity,	the	Commission	
was	prompted	to	develop	a	more	comprehensive	policy	on	how	it	would	interact	with	the	public.		It	
did	so	in	1992,	in	two	related	communications	adopted	on	the	same	day.31		The	first	communication	
promised	that	the	Commission	would	improve	its	efforts	to	make	policy	proposals	publicly	available	
in	an	explicit	attempt	to	invite	contributions	from	interest	groups.		The	second	communication	
addressed	more	directly	the	issue	of	interest	group	participation.		The	Commission	announced	that	
it	would	create	a	Single	Directory	of	the	interest	groups	with	contacts	with	the	Commission,	which	
would	supplement	the	existing,	uncoordinated	system	of	separate	lists	in	each	Directorate	General	
(DG)	and	would	streamline	the	process	of	interacting	with	interest	groups.		It	also	intended	to	tackle	
problematic	lobbying	practices	by	inviting	interest	groups	to	sign	a	voluntary	code	of	conduct.				
The	normative	inspiration	of	the	approach	put	forward	in	the	1992	communications	was	pluralist.		
The	Commission	explicitly	praised	the	added	value	of	interest	group	activity	as	providing	the	
																																								 																				
30	ALTER-EU,	Statement	on	the	new	framework	on	experts,	10	January	2010.	
31	Commission,	“An	open	and	structured	dialogue	between	the	Commission	and	special	interests	
groups”	[1993]	OJ	C63/02,	and	Commission,	“Increased	transparency	in	the	work	of	the	
Commission”,	[1993]	OJ	C63/03.	
administration	with	valuable	expertise.		The	objective	was	not	to	shape	directly	the	relationship	
between	administration	and	interest	groups	but	to	improve	the	transparency	of	the	Commission’s	
work,	so	as	to	facilitate	the	participation	of	interest	groups.		As	long	as	the	Commission	provided	
more	information	on	its	proposals,	free	interest	group	competition	would	guarantee	that	it	would	
obtain	the	necessary	policy	information.		‘In	exchange’	for	improved	contacts	with	the	Commission,	
interest	groups	were	simply	asked	to	abstain	from	unfair	lobbying	practices.			And	even	this	minimal	
attempt	to	regulate	interest	group	activity	was	entirely	voluntary,	and,	in	fact,	only	a	minority	of	
interest	groups	signed	codes	of	conduct.	
To	summarize,	the	Commission’s	initiative	at	the	start	of	the	1990s	sought	to	facilitate	broader	
involvement	in	informal	lobbying	by	making	a	number	of	changes	to	institutional	practice	that	would	
sit	on	top	of	the	existing		(unchanged)		system	of	advisory	committees.			It	did	so	through	
‘pluralisation	without	proceduralisation’:		the	two	communications	were	soft	law	documents,	which	
implied	that	the	promise	to	make	the	Commission’s	work	more	transparent	did	not	carry		any	rights	
to	participation	or	to	judicial	review.	
					
3.2. Civil	society:	‘pluralisation	without	proceduralisation’	(the	neo-corporatist	way)		
By	the	end	of	the	1990s-early	2000s,	the	paradigm	at	the	heart	of	the	Commission’s	approach	to	
interest	groups	shifted	dramatically,	at	least	in	the	discourse	employed	in	the	Commission’s	official	
publications.			At	the	time,	the	Commission	was	responding	to	at	least	two	developments	in	the	
broader	political	environment.		First,	despite	the	increased	role	of	the	European	Parliament	in	
European	decision-making,	and	the	efforts	in	the	Amsterdam	Treaty	to	address	the	EU’s	‘democratic	
deficit’,	the	EU	was	continuing	to	struggle	with	a	legitimacy	deficit.			Second,	the	protests	of	the	‘no	
global’	movement	had	brought	increased	public	attention	to	the	role	of	NGOs	in	international	
governance.		It	was	in	this	context	that	the	Commission’s	approach	to	interest	groups	began	to	be	
framed	by	the	concept	of	civil	society.	
The	Commission’s	paradigm-shift	first	came	to	light	in	the	area	of	social	policy.		On	issues	such	as	
anti-discrimination,	gender	policy	and	social	inclusion,	the	traditional	social	partners	had	been	side-
lined	by	a	number	of	newer	interest	organizations	with	a	more	direct	stake	in	the	policy	issues.		The	
Commission	recognized	this	reality	by	promoting,	alongside	the	social	dialogue	with	the	social	
partners	described	earlier,	a	‘civil	dialogue’	with	these	civil	society	organisations.		The	civil	dialogue	
did	not	provide	the	involved	organisations	with	powers	comparable	to	those	of	the	social	partners	in	
the	social	dialogue;	instead,	it	took	the	form	of	regular	forums	with	such	associations	(representing		
both	the	national	and	European	levels)	and	even	more	regular	meetings	with	representatives	from	
the	Europe-wide	associations.		Similar	initiatives	were	taken	in	areas	such	as	the	environment,	public	
health	and	(following	the	no	global	protests)	trade.		Hence,	in	several	areas,	extra	attention	was	paid	
to	including	‘weaker’	and	‘general	interest’	groups	in	the	policy-making	process	(as	opposed	to	
better-resourced	business	and	private	interest	groups).			
These	sectoral	developments	were	followed	by	the	Commission’s	general	statement	on	‘civil	society’	
in	its	White	Paper	on	European	Governance	(2001).		In	contrast	with	the	concepts	of	‘interest	
groups’	and	‘lobby	groups’,	which	often	invoke	suspicion,	the	Commission’s		use	of	the	term	‘civil	
society’	signalled	the		democratic	potential	of	bottom-up	participatory	processes.			According	to	the	
White	Paper,	civil	society	organisations	included	not	only	‘NGOs	but	also	trade	unions	and	
employers’	organisations,	professional	associations,	charities,	grass-roots	organisations,	
organisations	that	involve	citizens	and	local	and	municipal	life	with	a	particular	contribution	from	
churches	and	religious	communities’.32	Although	this	definition	was	not	comprehensive,	it	did	imply	
that	civil	society	organisations	were	more	representative	than	other	interest	groups.			The	White	
Paper,	therefore,	set	out	a	two-track	model	of	consultation:		on	the	one	hand,	a	set	of	common	
standards	and	principles	for	the	consultation	of	all	‘interested	parties’,	and	on	the	other	hand,	the	
development	of	‘more	extensive	partnership	arrangements’	with	more	representative	civil	society	
organisations.		
By	endorsing	a	special	relationship	with	more	representative	civil	society	organisations,	the	White	
Paper	suggested	a	pluralisation	of	the	neo-corporatist	method.		To	quote	directly	from	the	White	
Paper:	
On	the	Commission’s	part,	this	will	entail	a	commitment	for	additional	consultations	compared	to	
the	minimum	standards.	In	return,	the	arrangements	will	prompt	civil	society	organisations	to	
tighten	up	their	internal	structures,	furnish	guarantees	of	openness	and	representativity,	and	prove	
their	capacity	to	relay	information	or	lead	debates	in	the	Member	States	.	.	.	.		With	better	
involvement	comes	greater	responsibility.	Civil	society	must	itself	follow	the	principles	of	good	
governance,	which	include	accountability	and	openness.	
Just	as	social	partners	had	been	granted	privileged	access	because	of	their	representative	nature,	
new	civil	society	organisations	in	pluralised	contemporary	society,	such	as	environmental	or	
																																								 																				
32	Communication	from	the	Commission	of	25	July	2001	"European	governance	-	A	white	paper",	
COM(2001)	428	final	-	Official	Journal	C	287	of	12.10.2001.	
consumer	groups,	were	to	benefit		from	closer	involvement	as	long	as	they	were	non-profit	
associations	representative	of	broader	interests.			
It	is	clear,	however,	from	a	review	of	the	recent	history,	that	the	Commission	has	failed	
implementing	this	stated	commitment	to	a	special	relationship	with	civil	society	organisations.		The	
key	instrument	was	to	be	a	public	database	of	European	civil	society	organisations	(CONECCS).		The	
database	was	to	provide	Commission	officials	with	a	clear	list	of	‘more	representative	organisations’,	
while	for	civil	society	organisations	it	was	to	‘act	as	a	catalyst	to	improve	their	internal	organisation.’		
CONECCS,	however,	has	failed	to	fulfil	these	ambitions.			The	criteria	to	be	eligible	for	the	database	
were	not	demanding:		listed	organisations	had	to	be	non-profit	associations	with	the	mission	of	
representing	their	members,	be	organised	at	the	European	level,	i.e.	with	member	organisations	in	
at	least	two	EU	countries,	be	active	and	have	expertise	in	one	or	more	of	the	Commission’s	policy	
areas,	and	have	some	degree	of	formal	or	institutional	existence.		These	requirements	fell	far	short	
of	the	hard	representativeness	requirements	that	are	still	used	in	many	European	countries,	in	
particular	in	the	industrial	relations	field,	such	as	a	minimum	number	of	members	and	formal	
conditions	on	how	the	organization	is	to	guarantee	the	authority	and	accountability	of	individuals	
designated	to	speak	for	the	organization.		Even	more	important,	the	Commission	failed	to	develop	
‘extensive	partnership	arrangements’	that	would	incentivize	organizations	to	register	with	the	
database	and	meet	the	admittedly	minimal	criteria	required	for	registration.		Vice	versa,	Commission	
officials	had	little	reason	to	pay	more	attention	to	CONECCS	organisations	since	registration	did	not	
provide	much	of	a	guarantee	of	their	representative	quality.			In	sum,	despite	the	strong	rhetoric	in	
both	EU	official	documents	and	the	academic	debate,	the	civil	society	concept	seems	to	have	had	
relatively	little	influence	on	the	actual	consultation	practices	of	the	Commission.33	
	The	first	of	the	two	consultation	tracks	proposed	in	the	White	Paper—consultation	of	all	‘interested’	
parties--has	had	a	more	significant	impact.		In	2002,	the	Commission	adopted	a	communication	
spelling	out	in	more	detail	the	procedure	to	be	followed,	called	the	General	Principles	and	Minimum	
Standards	for	Consultation	of	Interested	Parties.		The	Principles	include:		wide	participation	
throughout	the	policy	chain,	in	particular	regarding	major	policy	initiatives;	effectiveness,	which	
implies	consulting	as	early	as	possible	but	also	in	a	manner	proportionate	to	the	impact	of	the	
proposal;	coherence	as	between	Commission	departments	in	how	they	conduct	consultations;	
																																								 																				
33	As	described	earlier,	there	was	change,	but	mainly	through	the	increased	use	of	forums	for	
European	civil	society	organisations	at	the	sectoral	level,	not	in	the	cross-cutting	fashion	advocated	
in	the	White	Paper.	
	
openness;		and	accountability.		The	Standards	require	that	the	Commission	provide	clear	information	
on	the	content	of	the	consultation	and	the	procedure	to	be	followed,	that	it	announce	the	
consultation	on	the	internet	via	the	single	access	point	Your	Voice,	that	it	allow	at	least	twelve	
weeks	for	interest	groups	to	submit	their	opinion,	and	that	it	acknowledge	receipt	of	opinions	as	
well	as	provides	‘adequate	feedback’.		Since	the	early	2000s,	the	Commission	has	conducted	
numerous	consultations	along	these	lines.			
	These	Principles	and	Standards	suggest	a	proceduralisation	of	Commission	consultation	practices	
but	in	actual	fact	the	proceduralisation	that	has	occurred	has	been	quite	limited	and	‘soft.’		A	
number	of	factors	have	contributed	to	this	result.		First,	the	requirements	are	set	down	in	a	non-
binding	Commission	Communication	and	are	phrased	so	as	to	leave	the	Commission	with	
considerable	discretion.		As	a	result,	they	cannot	be	relied	on	in	court,	except	as	an	interpretative	
tool	in	the	application	of	other,	binding	procedural	provisions	(in	those	few	case	where	such	
provisions	are	available),	and	can	generally	only	be	used	to	challenge	administrative	practice	via	the	
softer	mechanism	of	the	European	Ombudsman.			Second,	the	scope	of	the	Principles	and	Standards	
is	so	ambiguously	framed	as	to	avoid	tying	the	hands	of	the	Commission	in	most	cases,	with	the	
result	that	the	decision	to	go	ahead	with	a	consultation	is	generally	entirely	within	the	discretion	of	
the	Commission.		Third,	the	Communication	does	not	extend	to	all	of	the	Commission’s	consultation	
mechanisms.		The	Commission	states	that	it	will	‘focus	on	applying	the	general	principles	and	
minimum	standards	to	those	initiatives	that	will	be	subject	to	an	extended	impact	assessment’	and	
to	Green	and	White	Papers.	Explicitly	excluded	are	the	social	dialogue,	delegated	legislation,34	and	
more	generally	all	consultation	mechanisms	set	out	in	the	Treaties	or	in	other	Community	
legislation.		Most	institutionalised	consultation	mechanisms	thus	fall	outside	of	the	application	of	
these	general	principles	and	standards.		In	sum,	the	Principles	and	Standards	apply	mainly	at	the	
																																								 																				
34	The	text	refers	to	excluding	‘comitology’,	which	is	the	typical	EU	level	form	of	delegated	legislation	
(see	below).		
initial	stage	of	new	policy	initiatives,	generally	in	the	context	of	an	online	consultation,35	and	
sometimes	combined	with	the	drafting	of	an	impact	assessment.36		
Based	on	this	analysis	of	the	Principles	and	Standards,	two	especially	significant	gaps	in	the	
regulation	of	interest	representation	emerge.		First,	the	Communication	is	focused	on	the	initial	
stages	of	policymaking	and	participation	in	delegated	legislation	remains,	for	the	most	part,	a	black	
box.		Second,	the	system	of	advisory	committees	described	earlier	in	this	chapter	has	been	largely	
untouched.	The	Communication	states	that	‘where	a	formal	or	structured	consultation	body	exists,	
the	Commission	should	take	steps	to	ensure	its	composition	properly	reflects	the	sector	it	
represents’	(p.20,	emphasis	added).		The	Communication	,	however,		fails	to		provide	instruments	
and	criteria	for	ensuring	the	representative	composition	of	existing	consultation	bodies	and	to	the	
extent	that	balance	is	not	achieved	it	instructs	the	Commission	to		‘consider	how	to	ensure	that	all	
interests	are	being	taken	into	account	(e.g.	through	other	forms	of	consultation)’.		Here	we	see	the	
principal	strategy	employed	in	the	2002	Communication:		it	seeks	to	improve	interest	group	
participation	by	creating	an	additional	form	of	consultation	(i.e.	open	or	targeted	online	
consultation),	not	by	reforming	the	multiple,	existing	mechanism	of	interest	group	consultation.	
	
	
4. Towards	more	proceduralisation	and	American-style	pluralism?	
Over	the	past	decade,	there	have	been	three	major	developments	that	have	the	potential	to	move	
the	EU	towards	a	system	of	interest	group	intermediation	closer	to	the	American	pluralist	model:	
the	changes	introduced	by	the	Lisbon	Treaty,	the	better	regulation	debate,	and	the	Transparency	
Initiative.		The	following	section	carefully	analyzes	each	of	these	recent	additions	to	the	EU’s	
institutional	framework	and	concludes	that,	on	balance,	the	European	system	of	interest	
representation	remains	one	of	pluralisation	without	(hard)	proceduralisation.	
4.1. The	Lisbon	Treaty		
																																								 																				
35	On	the	Commission’s	Transparency	website,	the	Communication	is	linked	to	‘Your	Voice	in	
Europe’,	the	website	for	Commission	online	consultations,	but	not	to	the	Register	of	Expert	Groups,	
or	the	Comitology	Register.		See	http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/index_en.htm	(last	accessed	on:	
15/11/12).	
36	The	reader	should	note,	however,	that	online	consultations	and	impact	assessments	are	not	
always	conducted	in	tandem	or	for	the	same	policy	initiatives	(see	below).			
4.1.1.	Article	11	TFEU:	constitutionalising	participatory	democracy?	
At	the	constitutional	level,	there	has	been	one	particularly	visible	change	with	ramifications	for	
interest	group	participation.		The	Lisbon	Treaty,	which	entered	into	force	in	2009,	amended	the	
Treaty	on	European	Union	(TEU)	to	include	the	title	‘Provisions	on	Democratic	Principles’.		After	first	
establishing	in	Article	10	TEU	that	the	Union	is	based	on	the	principle	of	representative	democracy,	
Article	11	TEU	lists	various	types	of	other	participatory	procedures.		In	its	original	version	(in	the	
failed	Constitutional	Treaty)	Article	11	TEU	was	entitled	‘participatory	democracy’.	This	term	and	
concept	were	deleted	from	the	final	version,	but	the	substance	of	the	article	has	remained	the	same,	
and	reads	as	follows:			
1.	The	institutions	shall,	by	appropriate	means,	give	citizens	and	representative	associations	
the	opportunity	to	make	known	and	publicly	exchange	their	views	in	all	areas	of	Union	
action.	
2.	The	institutions	shall	maintain	an	open,	transparent	and	regular	dialogue	with	
representative	associations	and	civil	society.	
3.	The	European	Commission	shall	carry	out	broad	consultations	with	parties	concerned	in	
order	to	ensure	that	the	Union’s	actions	are	coherent	and	transparent.	
4.	Not	less	than	one	million	citizens	who	are	nationals	of	a	significant	number	of	Member	
States	may	take	the	initiative	of	inviting	the	European	Commission,	within	the	framework	of	
its	powers,	to	submit	any	appropriate	proposal	on	matters	where	citizens	consider	that	a	
legal	act	of	the	Union	is	required	for	the	purpose	of	implementing	the	Treaties…	
Article	11	TEU	was	the	product	of	an	effort	to	constitutionally	recognize	the	importance	of	
participatory	procedures	other	than	electoral	participation,	something	which	the	Commission	in	
particular	had	stressed	ever	since	the	publication	of	the	White	Paper	on	European	Governance.		
During	the	drafting	process,	the	scope	of	participatory	procedures	was	broadened	to	include	not	
only		‘civil	society’	or	interest	groups,		but	also	a	‘citizens’	initiative,’	since	it	was	argued	that	the	
debate	had	been	too	narrowly	focused	and	that	the		democratic	process	should	also,	or	even	above	
all,	ensure	that	citizens	could	participate	directly	in	policy-making.37		The	introduction	of	the	
‘citizens’	initiative’	procedure	(para.4),	which	allows	a	minimum	of	one	million	citizens	to	invite	the	
																																								 																				
37	For	details	on	the	debate	among	the	governments	and	elected	representatives	during	the	drafting	
process,	see	Smismans	(2004).	
European	Commission	to	take	action	is	therefore	the	most	innovative	part	of	Article	11	TEU,	
although	its	effect	is	likely	to	be	limited	(as	illustrated	by	its	practice	until	now).38		The	first	three	
paragraphs,	by	contrast,	seem	mainly	to	confirm	existing	institutional	practices	of	state-society	
relations.		The	formulation	is	vague	and	the	intent	behind	the	use	of	the	different	concepts	of	
‘representative	associations’,	‘civil	society’	and	‘parties	concerned’	is	unclear.			The	Article	neither	
introduces	new	procedures	for	interest	group	participation	nor	introduces	participatory	rights	
enforceable	in	court.		It	is	highly	unlikely	that	the	European	Court	of	Justice	could	ever	sanction	the	
Institutions	for	not	respecting	Article	11	TEU,	except	for	the	rare	and	fairly	implausible	scenario	in	
which	the	Institutions	do	not	provide	for	any	form	of	participation	at	all.		Nevertheless,	Article	11	
TEU	may	serve	as	instrument	for	the	soft	proceduralisation	of	interest	intermediation.			In	the	
future,	the	Court,	and	especially	the	Institutions	themselves,	may	rely	on	Article	11	TEU	together	
with	other	(mainly	soft)	procedural	requirements	to	underscore	the	importance	of	participation	for	
the	policy-making	process	and	may	thereby	contribute	to	a	culture	in	which	the	failure	to	establish	
and	follow	participatory	procedures	is	perceived	by	politicians	and	officials	as	breaching	institutional	
expectations.		In	this	respect,	the	reference	in	paragraph	2	to	all	institutions	is	particularly	
important,	since	until	now	only	the	Commission	has	consistently	paid	attention	to	participatory	
procedures.		
	
4.1.2.	Participation	in	the	new	system	of	delegated	legislation	and	comitology	
While	not	as	cleary	related	to	the	topic	of	interest	group	participation,	another	important	reform	
introduced	by	the	Lisbon	Treaty	deserves	our	attention,	namely	the	new	system	of	delegated	
legislation.		The	European	system	of	delegated	legislation	has	traditionally	functioned	via	so-called	
‘comitology’,	whereby	the	legislator	(the	European	Parliament	and	the	Council	on	the	initiative	of	
the	Commission)	delegates	to	the	Commission	the	task	of	adopting	further	regulatory	measures.		
The	Commission,	however,	is	required	to	do	so	in	interaction	with	a	‘comitology	committee’,	
composed	of	representatives	of	all	the	Member	States,	generally	drawn	from	the	national	
																																								 																				
38	The	experience	with	citizens’	initiatives	to	date	suggests	that	it	is	difficult	for	the	signatures	of	
such	a	relatively	low	number	of	citizens	(one	million)	to	force	substantial	changes	to	a	regulatory	
framework	that	has	been	carefully	crafted	by	the	democratically	representative	institutions	of	the		
European	Parliament	(through	direct	election	of	the	members	of	parliament)	and	the	Council	
(through	the	Member	States),	generally	after	broad	consultation	with	stakeholders	and	experts.	See	
Smismans	(forthcoming).	
authorities	dealing	with	the	particular	policy	area	at	issue.		This	system	is	designed	to	allow	the	
Member	States	to	retain	some	degree	of	control	over	policy-making	even	after	powers	are	
delegated	to	the	supranational	European	Commission.			Although	the	intricacies	of	comitology	are	
beyond	the	scope	of	this	chapter,	for	purposes	of	the	analysis	here	it	is	important	to	note	that	
neither	the	political	nor	the	academic	debate	has	paid	much	attention	to	the	issue	of	interest	group	
participation	in	comitology.		That	is	not	to	say	that	there	is	no	such	participation.		Advisory	or	expert	
groups	(as	described	above)	are	not	only	active	in	legislative	procedures	but	also	in	comitology	
procedures,	often	operating	alongside	comitology	committees,	and	the	issues	raised	in	delegated	
legislation	are	sometimes	the	target	of	lobbying	before	the	Commission	and	even	directly	before	
comitology	committees.		At	least	to	an	American	audience,	it	may	come	as	a	surprise	that	in	the	EU	
interest	group	participation	has	been	extensively	debated	in	the	context	of	legislative	action,	but	not	
delegated	legislation	and	the	comitology	procedure.					
The	debate	on	comitology	that	emerged	during	the	drafting	of	the	Lisbon	Treaty	afforded	a	political	
opportunity	to	consider	the	role	of	participatory	procedures	in	delegated	legislation.		This	
opportunity,	however,	was	missed	and,	as	in	the	previous	two	decades,	the	focus	was	on	the	place	
of	the	European	Parliament	in	delegated	legislation.			From	the	perspective	of	the	Parliament,	
delegated	legislation	is	problematic	because,	unlike	the	Member	States	which	can	exert	some	
control	via	comitology	committees,	the	Parliament	has	traditionally	had	no	role	in	delegated	
legislation.		Although	reforms	made	in	the	1990s	opened	the	door	to	some	parliamentary	
involvement,39	they	fell	short	of	expectations,	especially	in	view	of	the	Parliament’s	enhanced	
powers	over	legislation.		The	solution	in	the	Lisbon	Treaty	was	to	introduce	a	distinction	between	
‘legislative	acts’,	‘delegated	acts’	and	‘implementing	acts’.	While	the	material	scope	of	these	types	of	
acts	is	poorly	defined,40	and	has	been	strongly	criticised	in	the	literature	(Schutze	2011),41	the	
																																								 																				
39	Council	Decision	1999/468	laying	down	the	procedures	for	the	exercise	of	implementing	powers	
conferred	on	the	Commission,	OJ	1999	L	184/23;	and	Council	Decision	2006/512	amending	Decision	
1999/468,	OJ	2006	L200/11.	
40	This,	together	with	the	fact	that	the	categories	of	Regulation,	Directive	and	Decision	continue	to	
exist,	means	that	the	objective	of	a	clearer	hierarchy	of	norms	can	hardly	be	considered	to	have	
been	realised.		There	are	now	potentially	nine	types	of	instruments	that	can	be	adopted	under	the	
TEU:		Legislative	Regulations,	Directives	and	Decisions;	Delegated	Regulations,	Directives	and	
Decisions;	and	potentially	Implementing	Regulations,	Directives	and	Decisions.	
normative	aspiration	behind	the	text	was	to	create	a	hierarchy	of	norms	that	would	correspond	with	
the	appropriate	level	of	parliamentary	involvement.			The	most	important	norms	are	to	be	set	down	
in	legislative	acts	adopted	by	the		legislator	(the	Parliament	and	the	Council	on	initiative	of	the	
Commission),	acts	of	general	application	‘supplementing	or	amending	certain	non-essential	
elements	of	a	legislative	act’	(Article	190	TFEU)	are	to	be	adopted	in	delegated	acts,	by	the	
Commission	under	the	control	of	the	Parliament	and	the	Council,	and	executive	implementing	acts		
are	primarily	the	responsibility	of	the	Commission.			Delegated	acts	are	to	be	controlled	equally	by	
the	Parliament	and	the	Council:		either	the	Parliament	or	Council	may	revoke	the	delegation;	or	they	
may	object	to	a	delegated	act	within	a	period	set	out	by	the	legislative	act.42			Implementing	acts	
continue	to	be	adopted	through	a	system	of	comitology,	leaving	control	of	the	Commission	in	the	
hands	of	the	Member	States,	with	virtually	no	involvement	of	the	Parliament.		
In	these	changes	wrought	by	the	Lisbon	Treaty,	the	Parliament	was	the	winner,	since	it	obtained	
considerably	more	control	power	over	delegated	acts,	while	the	Member	States	saw	their	powers	
diminished	somewhat	since	comitology	committees	were	eliminated	for	delegated	acts.			Yet	the	
provision	on	delegated	acts	was	also	a	missed	opportunity.		At	the	time	of	the	drafting	of	this	new	
hierarchy	of	norms,	I	argued	that	the	new	distinction	may	open	the	way	for	the	reconsideration	of	
the	role	of	proceduralisation	of	participatory	processes	(Smismans	2005).		Since	the	experience	of	
other	democracies	suggests	that	legislative	vetoes	are	a	very	blunt	instrument	of	control	that	are	
rarely	used	(Schutze	2011:	664),	I	argued	that	participatory	procedures	offered	an	additional	
mechanism	for	holding	the	administration	accountable.		Interest	group	participation,	however,	
never	entered	into	the	debate	during	the	drafting	of	the	Lisbon	Treaty	(or	its	forerunner,	the	
Constitutional	Treaty).		For	both	the	Member	States	and	many	Members	of	Parliament,	the	arcane	
topic	of	comitology	appeared	difficult	enough	to	understand,	even	without	including	the	topic	of	
interest	group	participation.			
The	adoption	of	the	Lisbon	Treaty	did	not	end	the	debates	over	delegated	acts	and	implementing	
acts.		In	2011,	the	Parliament	and	Council	adopted	a	new	legislative	framework	for	comitology	in	
implementing	acts	and,	somewhat	surprisingly,	this	legislative	framework	actually	reduced	the	
Parliament’s	powers,	as	it	no	longer	has	a	right	of	scrutiny	over	the	resulting	implementing	acts	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
41	As	Hofmann	(2009:	499)	puts	it:	‘The	opaqueness	of	EU	law	has	been	deliberately	taken	to	a	new	
level	in	order	to	make	an	abstract	theoretical	point	of	typology	to	press	the	EU	into	a	state-like	
federal	model’.		
42It	is	up	to	the	delegating	legislation	to	choose	between	these	two	control	mechanisms.	
(Christiansen	and	Dobbels	2012).	43		At	the	same	time,	the	Member	States	fought	back	to	regain	
power	over	delegated	acts.		While	Article	190	TFEU	does	not	provide	for	comitology	in	the	case	of	
delegated	acts	and	the	Commission	has	refused	to	create	comitology	committees	with	formal	
powers,	the	Member	States	have	obtained	a	political	commitment	from	the	Commission	to	consult	
with	Member	State	representatives	(Christiansen	and	Dobbels	2012:	17).			This	has	been	set	down	in	
a	non-binding	‘Common	Understanding’	signed	by	the	Commission,	Council,	and	Parliament:		when	
drafting	delegated	acts,	the	Commission	agrees	to	conduct	consultations	with	the	Council	and	the	
Parliament,	and	to	send	both	institutions	all	the	relevant	preparatory	documents,	while	at	the	same	
time	retaining	discretion	over	how	to	organise	such	consultations.44		
To	conclude	this	discussion	of	the	Lisbon	Treaty,	the	outcome	from	the	perspective	of	participatory	
procedure	was	disappointing	overall.			Instead	of	a	transparent	system	of	control	over	delegated	acts	
based,	on	the	one	hand,	on	the	legislative	veto	and,	on	the	other	hand,	the	proceduralised	
participation	of	interest	groups,	the	end	result	was	a	system	of	protracted	Member	State	control	
behind	the	scenes.		Although	interest	groups	certainly	exercise	influence	through	lobbying,	this	
remains	largely	unregulated	and	outside	of	the	public	eye.		The	latter	can	equally	be	said	of	the	new	
system	of	comitology	under	the	new	Comitology	Regulation	of	2011,	which	applies	to	implementing	
acts,	and	has	left	the	(non)	regulation	of	interest	group	participation	in	these	procedures	completely	
untouched.		In	sum,	despite	the	intense	debates	spanning	over	a	decade,	the	role	of	interest	group	
participation	in	the	EU’s	system	of	delegated	legislation	remains	inside	a	black	box;	as	we	will	see	in	
the	next	section,	the	debate	on	better	regulation	might	just	provide	some	opportunity	to	open	the	
black	box.	
			
4.2. The	better	regulation	debate	
The	better	regulation	debate	began	with	the	2000	Lisbon	Strategy	to	make	the	EU	the	‘most	
competitive	knowledge-based	economy	in	the	world.’		Like	elsewhere,	‘better	regulation’	has	meant	
																																								 																				
43	European	Union	(2011)	‘Regulation	(EU)	No	182/2011	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	
Council	of	16	February	2011	laying	down	the	rules	and	general	principles	concerning	mechanisms	for	
control	by	Member	States	of	the	Commission’s	exercise	of	implementing	powers’,	Official	Journal	of	
the	European	Union,	L	55/12,	Brussels,	28.2.2011.	
44	Council	of	the	European	Union,	Common	Understanding	–	Delegated	Acts,	8753/11,	11	April	2011.	
to	a	great	extent	‘less	regulation’,	as	the	focus	has	been	on	reducing	the	regulatory	burden	on	the	
market.		In	the	EU,	however,	with	its	constant	search	for	greater	legitimacy,	better	regulation	also	
became	related	to	arguments	about	participation	in	policy-making.		This	was	particularly	the	case	
around	the	time	of	the	White	Paper	on	European	Governance	(2001).		Two	‘participation	topics’	in	
particular	entered	the	better	regulation	debate,	namely	the	importance	of	consultation	during	
impact	assessments	(IA)	and	the	need	to	reflect	on	alternative	regulatory	instruments	via	co-
regulation	and	self-regulation.45		I	focus	here	on	the	former.	
Since	2003,	IAs	have	been	routinely	issued	by	the	Commission.		The	Commission	drafts	IAs	for	all	
major	policy	proposals,	i.e.	mainly	legislative	proposals	but	also	policy	programmes	and	key	
communications.		The	EU’s	impact	assessment	system	is	characterised	by	a	broad	‘integrated	
approach’,	which	includes	an	assessment	of	economic,	social	and	environmental	impacts.	To	realise	
such	an	integrated	approach,	the	involvement	of	all	relevant	stakeholders	is	essential.		The	2009	
Commission	Guidelines	on	IAs	identify	three	essential	variants	of	sound	evidence	for	IAs,	namely	
‘internal	expertise’	(i.e.	available	in	Commission	Directorates	General	other	than	the	one	drafting	the	
IA),	‘external	expertise’	(i.e.	drawn	from	expert	committees,	European	agencies,	and	independent	
experts),	and	‘consultation	with	interested	parties’.						
In	theory,	IA	could	serve	as	a	vehicle	for	the	proceduralisation	of	interest	representation,	similar	to	
notice-and-comment	rulemaking	in	the	United	States.		In	such	a	system,	if	the	Commission	in	
conducting	an	IA	failed	to	consult	the	public	or	consulted	but	entirely	discarded	the	opinions	
expressed	by	the	public,	the	final	outcome	could	be	challenged	in	court.			However,	the	European	
system	allows,	at	best,	for	only	a	very	soft	form	of	proceduralisation.		To	begin	with,	the	procedural	
rules	for	IAs	are	set	out	in	Guidelines,	i.e.	a	soft	law	instrument	not	directly	justiciable	in	court.		
Although	the	European	Court	of	Justice	has	recognised	that	the	Commission	may	create	legitimate	
expectations	enforceable	in	court	by	promising	administrative	behaviour	through	such	soft	law	
documents,	it	is	unlikely	that	Court	would	find	that	the	Guidelines	on	IAs	give	rise	to	a	legitimate	
expectation	of	stakeholder	participation	since	they	afford	the	Commission	with	considerable	leeway.			
According	to	the	Guidelines,	IAs	are	based	on	the	principle	of	‘proportionate	analysis’,	which	also	
extends	to	how	participation	is	organised:			it	is	for	the	Commission	to	decide	how	to	organise	
participation	‘proportionate	to’	the	importance	and	scope	of	an	initiative.		Most	importantly,	the	
Guidelines	do	not	set	out	any	specific	procedure	for	stakeholder	involvement―whether	through	
advisory	committees,	online	consultations,	or	informal	contacts.			They	do	state	that	the	Commission	
																																								 																				
45	European	Parliament,	Council	and	Commission,	Interinstitutional	Agreement	on	Better	Law-
Making	OJ	2003/C,	321/01.	
should	respect	the	2002	Principles	and	Standards	of	Consultation	but,	as	analysed	above,	these	
Principles	and	Standards	are	notoriously	flexible.		Therefore,	even	though	it	is	correct	that	the	
information	included	in	IAs	may	inform	the	Court’s	application	of	substantive	review	principles	such	
as	subsidiarity	and	proportionality	(Alemanno	2011)	it	is	unlikely	that	the	very	vague	standards	for	
consultations	on	IAs	will	give	rise	to	a	new	ground	of	review	based	on	the	violation	of	a	procedural	
requirement.			
Even	though	the	role	for	courts	is	limited,	a	softer	form	of	proceduralisation	of	IAs	may	emerge	in	
the	future.		All	IAs	are	screened	by	the	European	Impact	Assessment	Board	(IAB),	which	is	a	body	
composed	of	senior	officials	within	the	European	Commission.		If	the	IAB	considers	that	an	IA	does	
not	respect	the	IA	Guidelines,	the	IA	will	be	sent	back	for	readjustment	to	the	Directorate	General	
which	drafted	it.		It	is	the	task	of	the	IAB	to	strike	the	fine	balance	between	leaving	the	DGs	
flexibility,	in	line	with	the	principle	of	proportionate	analysis,	and	establishing	a	common	practice	
with	minimum	standards	applicable	to	all	IAs.	This	is	equally	the	case	for	issues	of	participation	
within	the	IA	procedure.		To	date,	the	IAB	has	mainly	insisted	that	when	the	Commission	decides	to	
hold	a	consultation,	the	responsible	DG	should	make	more	of	an	effort	to	ensure	that	stakeholder	
views	are	represented	throughout	the	entire	IA,	in	particular	on	all	the	policy	options	proposed	in	
the	IA.46		In	theory,	however,	the	IAB	could	become	more	demanding	with	participation	
requirements.		For	instance,	some	DGs	publish	all	individual	opinions	of	stakeholders	with	the	IA,	
while	others	only	provide	a	synthesis	of	the	opinions.		Some	DGs,	when	sending	an	IA	to	the	other	
Institutions	attach	all	the	opinions,	others	attach	an	overview,	and	yet	others	also	publish	the	
opinions	or	the	overview	online.		The	IAB	could	develop	a	common	approach	on	this	and	other	
elements	of	the	consultation	procedure.		It	could	go	even	further	and	require	DGs	to	reflect	and	
report	on	the	representativeness	of	their	consultation	procedures,	in	line	with	the	soft	guidelines	
provided	in	the	2002	Principles	and	Standards	of	Communication.			It	is	unlikely,	however,	that	the	
IAB	will	take	this	step,	since	participation	has	never	been	a	key	priority	for	the	Board,	and	it	has	
become	especially	less	so	in	recent	years	as	the	better	regulation	agenda	has	become	focused	more	
on	competitiveness		and	less	on	improving	legitimacy	through	participation	(Radaelli	2007:194).	
One	area	currently	in	flux	is	the	role	of	IAs	in	delegated	legislation	and	comitology.		As	explained	
earlier	and	in	contrast	with	the	U.S.,	IAs	have	traditionally	been	used	for	major	policy	initiatives,	i.e.	
legislation,	and	not	for	classic	administrative	rules	(see	Weiner	and	Ribero	in	this	volume).		In	2009,	
for	the	first	time,	the	Commission	recognized	that	IAs	could	also	be	used	for	delegated	legislation	
																																								 																				
46	This	conclusion	is	based	on	an	analysis	of	20	IAs	(in	different	policy	fields)	as	well	as	the	annual	IAB	
reports	as	part	of	the	LASI	project.		See	above	footnote	1.	
and	comitology.47		As	was	argued	above	in	discussing	the	treatment	of	delegated	legislation	in	the	
Lisbon	Treaty,	this	represents	a	positive	development	with	the	potential	to	shed	light	on	the	
currently	opaque	system	of	interest	group	participation	at	the	implementing	phase	of	the	policy-
making	process.			The	reality,	however,	is	still	quite	limited.		The	number	of	IAs	in	delegated	
legislation	and	comitology	is	still	very	low.48			Moreover,	it	remains	to	be	seen	what	type	of	
consultations,	if	any,	will	be	held	in	the	context	of	such	IAs:		since	both	the	content	and	procedure	of	
IAs	are	to	be	“proportionate”	to	the	nature	of	the	proposal,	which	in	the	case	of	delegated	acts	and	
implementing	acts	can	be	expected	to	be	less	significant,	and	since	IAs	for	delegated	and	
implementing	acts	are	to	avoid	re-considering	issues	that	were	already	assessed	in	the	context	of	
the		legislative	act,		any	consultation	that	is	held	might	very	well	be	quite	cursory	(Alemanno	and	
Meuwese	2013;	Mendes	2013).	
Before	leaving	the	subject	of	IAs,	it	bears	asking	if	and	how	this	layer	of	procedure	departs	from	the	
patterns	of	interest	representation	established	by	the	other	participation	procedures	and	
institutions	discussed	earlier	in	this	chapter.		Although	the	experience	in	this	field	is	still	quite	new,	
several	preliminary	conclusions	can	be	drawn	from	research	conducted	in	the	context	of	the	LASI	
project.49	We	assessed	all	IAs	adopted	between	2003	and	2013	(830	in	total)	on	the	basis	of	the	
information	on	participation	provided	by	the	IA	reports	(which	always	include	a	section	with	
information	on	the	actors	consulted).		Despite	the	discursive	insistence	on	the	importance	of	broad	
stakeholder	participation,	IAs	do	not	appear	to	have	led	to	a	general	pluralisation	of	the	consultation	
procedure.	Although	IAs	have	increasingly	come	to	use	general	online	consultations,	they	remain	the	
exception	rather	than	the	rule,	and	represent	only	25%	of	all	IAs.		In	addition	to	any	online	
consultation	procedure,	the	Directorate	General	responsible	for	preparing	an	IA	will	involve,	on	
average,	10.3	actors,	which	can	include	Commission	DGs,	European	expert	committees	or	agencies,	
interest	groups,	and	consultancies.	Although	it	is	necessary	to	investigate	further	how	IAs	may	or	
may	not	have	changed	established	patterns	of	participation	through	advisory	committees	or	via	
informal	lobbying,	our	data	support	the	conclusion	that	IAs	have	not	significantly	expanded	the	
number	or	types	of	actors	consulted	by	the	Commission	and	consequently	have	not	produced	a	
general	pluralisation	of	interest	group	participation	in	rulemaking.			
																																								 																				
47	2009	Guidelines,	supra	at	_.			
48		In	the	period	2009-2013,	3	IAs	were	adopted	for	delegated	acts,	and	21	for	implementing	acts.		
49	LASI	is	an	ERC	funded	research	project	dealing	with	‘Law,	science	and	interests	in	European	policy-
making’.	(see	footnote	1).	I	would	like	to	thank	my	colleague	Dr	Emanuela	Bozzini	for	the	statistical	
analysis.		For	a	more	detailed	treatment	of	the	argument,	see	Bozzini	and	Smismans	(forthcoming).	
	4.3. The	transparency	debate		
In	2006	the	European	Commission	launched	the	European	Transparency	Initiative	(ETI).50,		The	main	
objective	of	the	ETI	was	not	to	shape	interest	group	participation	but	to	make	it	more	transparent.		
In	addition	to	providing	an	online	 list	of	beneficiaries	of	EU	funding,51	the	key	 innovation	has	been	
the	introduction	of	a	‘Transparency	Register’―an	online	register	of	lobbyists	applicable	to	both	the	
European	 Commission	 and	 the	 European	 Parliament	 which	 replaces	 the	 CONECCS	 database	
discussed	earlier.52	Unlike	CONECCS,	which	only	listed	European	civil	society	organisations	as	part	of	
the	 effort	 to	 incentivize	 more	 representative	 organisations,	 the	 Transparency	 Register	 aims	 to	
include	 all	 types	 of	 lobbying	 actors,	 whether	 NGOs,	 think-tanks,	 academic	 institutions,	 in-house	
lobbyists	 or	 consultancies.	 	 Compared	 to	 CONECCS,	 it	 also	 records	more	 information	 on	 lobbying	
actors,	 in	 particular	 regarding	 their	 financial	 resources.	 	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 organizations	 that	
register	are	required	to	sign	a	code	of	conduct	on	good	lobbying	practices.				
At	first	sight,	the	Transparency	Initiative	is	inspired	by	the	pluralist	tradition,	but	a	closer	look	reveals	
it	may	be	used	in	a	way	closer	to	the	neo-corporatist	tradition	discussed	earlier.		On	the	one	hand,	
the	 Register	 promotes	 free	 competition	 among	 interest	 groups	 to	 influence	 policy-making	 by	
ensuring	 that	 the	 process	 is	 transparent	 and	 that	 the	 actors	 follow	minimum	 standards	 of	 ethical	
lobbying	 behaviour.	 	 Although	 the	 Register	 is	 not	 obligatory,	 estimates	 suggest	 that	 about	 three	
quarters	of	EU-level	 lobbying	actors	are	now	registered,	 thanks	to	a	system	of	persuasion,	naming	
and	 shaming,	 and	 carrots	 rather	 than	 sticks,	 such	 as	 an	 early-alert	 email	 system	 for	 new	
consultations.	 53	 	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 does	 not	 create	 any	 new	 procedural	 rights	 to	 influence	
																																								 																				
50	COM	(2006)	194	final.	
51	See	http://ec.europa.eu/budget/fts/index_en.htm,	last	access	on	20/08/14.		
52	Communication	Follow-up	to	the	Green	Paper	“European	Transparency	Initiative”	COM(2007)127	
final;	 Communication	 European	 Transparency	 Initiative:	 A	 framework	 for	 relations	 with	 interest	
representatives	 (Register	 and	 Code	 of	 Conduct)	 COM(2008)323	 final;	 Agreement	 between	 the	
European	Parliament	and	the	European	Commission	on	the	establishment	of	a	transparency	register	
for	 organisations	 and	 self-employed	 individuals	 engaged	 in	 EU	 policy-making	 and	 policy	
implementation,	[2011]	OJ	L191/29	.	
53	These	are	estimates	as	it	is	difficult	to	identify	the	exact	number	of	actors	involved	in	EU	lobbying.	
See	Greenwood	and	Dreger	(2013).	
government	 decision	 making,	 as	 found	 in	 the	 pluralist	 American	 system	 of	 notice-and-comment	
rulemaking.		Moreover,	as	a	result	of	the	Transparency	Register,	the	Commission	and	the	European	
Parliament	now	have	at	their	disposal	considerably	more	information	on	lobbying	actors,	which	can	
be	 used	 to	 determine	whether	 organizations	 and	 groups	 are	 representative	 and	 can	 help	 achieve	
balanced	 interest	representation	on	advisory	committees.54	 	The	Register	would	thus	function	as	a	
tool	within	a	neo-corporatist	setting.	
	
5. Conclusion	
	
Interest	group	participation	in	the	European	Union	has	evolved	considerably	since	the	creation	of	
the	European	Economic	Community	in	1957.			As	the	powers	of	the	EU	increased,	interest	groups	
shifted	their	attention	to	the	European	level,	formed	European	‘umbrella	organisations’,	and	often	
set	up	offices	in	Brussels.		At	the	same	time,	broader	societal	forces	produced	new	social	
movements,	a	proliferation	of	functional	categories,	and	considerable	pluralisation	of	interest	
groups.			In	response,	the	EU	has	opened	its	policy-making	process	to	a	variety	of	interest	groups.		
The	multiple	access	points	for	interest	group	influence—through	the	Commission,	the	European	
Parliament,	and	national	representatives	in	the	Council―has	also	led	many	observers	to	describe	the	
EU	as	a	pluralist	system	of	interest	intermediation.			At	the	same	time,	the	EU’s	institutions	have	
been	shaped	by	the	neo-corporatist	legacy	that	characterises	many	of	its	Member	States.		Thus	the	
system	of	interest	intermediation	traditionally	contained	two	parallel	strands:		on	the	one	hand,	
extensive,	informal	lobbying	and,	on	the	other	hand,		formal	advisory	committees	as	way	for	the	
public	administration	(principally	the	Commission)	to	ensure,	at	least	in	theory,	balanced	interest	
representation	in	policy-making.	
From	a	comparative	perspective,	especially	for	those	familiar	with	the	American	neo-pluralist	model	
of	interest	representation,	there	are	two	striking	elements	of	the	European	system.		First,	legally	
binding	participation	rights	and	procedures	that	can	be	enforced	in	court	are	largely	absent.		
Although	there	are	minor	exceptions	to	this	rule,55	most	participatory	processes	are	entirely	informal	
or	are	set	down	in	soft	law	documents	which	provide	virtually	no	scope	for	judicial	review.		Second,	
																																								 																				
54	For	a	more	detailed	analysis	of	this	argument,	see	Smismans	(2014).	
55	The	primary	ones	are	in	the	area	of	state	aid	policy,	see	Mendes	(2011),	and	in	those	cases	where	
legislation	requires	the	consultation	of	an	advisory	committee	and	the	Commission	entirely	fails	to	
consult	the	committee	(an	extremely	remote	scenario).		
to	the	extent	that	the	political	debate	has	considered	interest	group	participation,	the	focus	has	
been	on	participation	in	legislative	decision-making,	not	delegated	legislation	(or	rulemaking	in	
American	legal	terminology).					This	can	be	explained	by	the	EU’s	(perceived)	lack	of	legitimacy:	in	
the	1990s	and	2000s	repeated	attempts	at	EU	institutional	reform	have	sought	to	address	the	
concern	that	EU	decision-making	is	removed	from	the	concerns	of	its	citizens	and	improving	
participation	before	the	Commission,	when	it	drafts	legislation,	represents	one	such	effort	at	
democratic	innovation.		It	must	be	said,	however,	that	the	silence	on	participation	and	delegated	
legislation	remains	remarkable.	
Over	the	last	two	decades	the	EU	has	attempted	to	formalise	somewhat	its	relations	with	interest	
groups.		Above	all,	the	system	has	become	more	transparent	with	the	Register	of	Expert	Groups	on	
advisory	committees	and	the	Transparency	Register	on	lobbying	organizations.		Since	the	end	of	the	
1990s,	and	particularly	since	the	White	Paper	on	European	Governance,	the	EU	also	has	attempted	
to	make	its	system	of	interest	intermediation	more	‘representative’	or	‘balanced’.		However,	instead	
of	reforming	the	existing	system,	in	particular	advisory	committees,	the	Commission	has	mainly	
inserted	the	additional	step	of	a	broad-based	online	consultation	at	the	start	of	the	(legislative)	
policy-making	process—	pluralising	the	system	by	adding	another	participation	layer.	
Although	more	recent	efforts	at	reform,	such	as	the	better	regulation	debate	and	the	Transparency	
Initiative,	have	clearly	been	inspired	by	American	regulatory	law	and	practice,	the	European	system	
of	interest	group	participation	continues	to	be	shaped	by	its	neo-corporatist	legacy	and	is	best	
conceptualized	as		‘institutionalised	but	not	proceduralised’.		There	is	no	sign	that	European	political	
and	administrative	elites	have	any	intention	of	pursuing	such	a	strongly	proceduralised	route,	at	
least	in	the	foreseeable	future.		Neither	would	I	argue	that	such	route	would	be	preferable.		The	
European	institutional	tradition	tends	to	rely	on	the	administration	to	ensure	that	policy-making	is	
informed	by	a	balanced	representation	of	interests,	while	the	American	one	places	more	trust	in	
market-style	free	competition	between	interest	groups	to	achieve	fair	representation.			Evidence	on	
both	sides	of	the	Atlantic	shows	that	policy-making	is	biased	in	favour	of	corporate	and	business	
interests	and	against	broader	societal	interests.	The	jury	is	still	out	on	whether	either	of	the	two	
systems	is	‘more	effective’	or	‘fairer’,	and	any	judgment	will	inevitably	reflect,	at	least	in	part,	
normative	attitudes	towards	the	state	and	interest	groups	more	broadly	speaking.		For	the	moment,	
despite	the	discourse	in	American	law	of	formal	equality	and	procedural	rights,	on	the	European	side	
of	the	Atlantic	the	perception	is	that	for	all	of	its	imperfections,	a	system	that	relies	less	on	courts	
and	more	on	administrative	and	political	actors	to	remedy	imbalances	in	representation	is	fairer	
overall.					
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